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**Poland in Russia's Foreign Policy, Speech of the Minister
of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation Andrei Kozyrev
at the Polish-Russian Conference "Towards a New Partnership,"
Cracow, April 23, 1994**

Having regard to the fact that the conference, which aims to consider methods of developing a new partnership, takes place in Cracow—the historical and cultural centre of Europe—is symbolic. Cracow is dear not only for the Polish but also for the Russian people. Both nations paid with the lives of their people to save this unique city. We are grateful to the Poles for remembering those who were killed and for taking care of their graves. The memory of those who were killed, resting in this land, is a sacred thing. Similarly, the memory of the victims of totalitarianism on the territories of the former USSR is a sacred thing, including the memory of the sons of the Polish nation resting in Katyn and Mednoye.

The Russians and Poles are not only united by history with its light and dark sides. Our present and future are common. Both our nations are striving to free the economy from post-communist maladies, to build a democratic state, to provide our countries with a decent position in the world as soon as possible. For both our countries, the aggressive nationalism of Brezhnev's doctrine⁹⁴ or the Berlin Wall, as well as the pursuit of domination or *cordons sanitaire* are just as unacceptable. Both our countries strive to ensure stability and security throughout Europe in order to overcome ethnic conflicts.

To achieve these tasks, a consistent strategy must be developed to strengthen the unity of all democratic countries in Europe—a pan-European partnership. Today, we are dealing with declarations of intent and partnership agreements. But a well-structured, stable, and mature partnership with necessary means does not yet exist. This is evidenced by the difficulties faced by Russia and other post-communist countries

⁹⁴ The Brezhnev Doctrine, also known as the doctrine of limited sovereignty, is an informal definition of the dominant political position in the Soviet strategy, assuming that the Soviet Union is ready to defend, including by armed force, the communist system in the bloc countries. An example of the implementation of this doctrine was the USSR's armed interventions against anti-government or anti-communist demonstrations in the GDR (June 1953), Hungary (November 1956), and Czechoslovakia (August 1968). The formal basis is usually considered to be an editorial article in the body of the CPSU, the newspaper Pravda, which was published in August 1969, on the anniversary of the suppression of the Prague Spring.

in negotiating with the Western partners on market access without discrimination and based on free competition. Today, for example, the European Union offers the maximum possible 10% share of exports of fissile materials to a democratic Russia while not so long ago the Soviet Union had a 16% share.

The partnership in the field of policy is still exposed to serious trials on the sharp turns of European politics. A recent example is the unilateral Sarajevo ultimatum. One can argue about purposefulness or futility concerning the threat of forceful solutions after a certain deadline. Today, this is a thing of the past, and there is no point to consider all pros and cons. It is obvious, however, that making such decisions without consultation and agreement with all leading politicians involved in the issue of resolving the Yugoslavia conflict, is impossible. Attempts to bypass Russia are dangerous, as such actions automatically introduce unnecessary tension, and even—let me put it straight—risk.

And this is why it is particularly important today not to miss the momentum obtained by the initiative of President Yeltsin, which led to significant progress in unblocking Sarajevo. Vigorous and joint actions are necessary. These may even be very decisive actions, but only jointly. In the context of joint efforts, individual states—Russia, the U.S., Germany, Poland, and other European states as well as state organisations, including NATO—will find a place for themselves and contribute.

The division into blocs and bipolar security system is being forever replaced by multipolar world realities. To succumb to illusions, as have some naive political scientists, that membership in a political and military alliance is a panacea for all misfortunes, means not perceiving the essence of the processes taking place in Europe, failure to understand the essence of “new generation” crises. Such an approach, by definition, implies the existence—if not a real—of an imaginary opponent. This may result in creating new divisions and splits in Europe. Not only do the nightmares of the past persist: aggressive nationalism, territorial claims, religious intolerance—moreover, the danger of them turning into real European policymaking factors increases.

It must not be accepted that Europe is currently experiencing another division of spheres of influence. We are convinced that it is important not to miss the opportunity to shape a single, common democratic Europe, which implies ensuring the same level of security

for all countries, a real partnership based on common democratic principles of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe.

I am genuinely concerned about the viability of some archaic dogmas and arguments. Some politicians try to present them as axioms of modern European politics.

Argument One:

Speeding up the accession of Eastern European countries to NATO will not only “remove the barriers that divide Europe,” but will also be a step towards strengthening democracy and stability, which will benefit Russia itself. The question is, for which Russia? Russia, the powerful state on the road to democratic change and open to the world, or a Russia isolated and, as a result, able to transform itself back into a military camp?

The second argument, not entirely inconsistent with the first one: “The enlargement of NATO to include the Eastern European countries is necessary because Russia is unpredictable and infected by neo-imperial ambitions.” Well, if new barriers and isolation of Russia emerge in Europe, Russia would become predictable: it would threaten its neighbours with missiles.

Argument three: “Russia intends to prevent Central and Eastern European countries from satisfying their need for stable security.” That’s not so either. We do not question a country’s sovereign right to defend itself, including by joining some military-political alliances. But if we want to live in peace for ourselves and our children, the criterion here should be the extent to which such an undertaking is conducive to the stability of the whole region and the world.

We assume that there are no grounds for dividing the countries of Europe into those that threaten and those that are threatened. Today, it is the Europeans who are on one side, and the problems that are to be overcome—economic, social, national—on the other. And this is what the three components of European security are, which cannot be separated. For decades, the dissident democrats in our countries have fought for common values, looking at CSCE, the only pan-European structure, as a polar star. And now “patriots,” nationalists, are undermining these values. But for the first time we have a rare opportunity to defend these values, using many European institutions. Hence, the concept of establishing a pan-European partnership proposed by Russia. Here are its main elements:

First, the development of Euro-Atlantic cooperation by transforming the CSCE into an efficient pan-regional political organisation and the North Atlantic Cooperation Council into an autonomous but closely

linked to the CSCE structure for military-political cooperation. The aim is to coordinate the efforts of NATO, the EU, the Council of Europe, the Western European Union, and the CIS in strengthening stability and security, peacekeeping activities and the protection of the rights of national minorities in Europe.

Second, extending the cooperation within the North Atlantic Cooperation Council to include European neutral countries, also for the purpose of implementing the Partnership for Peace programme based on equality. Transforming the North Atlantic Cooperation Council into an independent body with a small bureaucratic staff. The North Atlantic Cooperation Council could become a European laboratory for peace activities, transparency of military activities, conversion of military and industrial complexes.

Third, creating a network of complementary bilateral partnership, cooperation and consultation agreements, not only between NATO, on the one hand, and the countries of Central and Eastern Europe, Russia, Ukraine and so on, on the other hand, but also between countries that are not members of the Alliance. We do not rule out the future membership of Russia in NATO, but for today the most important is the category of partnership. The advantage, or in other words, the evidence of far-sightedness of NATO leadership contained in the Partnership for Peace programme is that this proposal somehow opens up NATO and is the first step towards transforming it from a military alliance into another form of security organisation. In this way, it fully fits into our concept of a pan-European partnership. In the future we also see opening the CIS-NATO channel.

Fourth, providing Central European countries with a network of “crossing” security guarantees by Russia and its Western European partners. Such a network could be extended to the whole of Europe.

Fifth, increasing the peace potential of European countries. Searching for methods of European solidarity in response to “new generation” conflicts. Practical support for the peace efforts of Russia and the CIS in the former USSR.

Sixth, strengthened control of non-proliferation of nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction, missile technology, strengthening controls on trade in dual-use technologies, conventional weapons with the greatest destructive power, with particular attention to conflict zones.

Seventh, increase economic potential to ensure stability and security on the continent. Inclusion of Russia and the Eastern European countries in the international division of labour on an equal

and non-discriminatory basis. Ensure that all countries have access to European and world markets.

We are ready to cooperate closely with Poland and other countries from Eastern Europe in search of the most beneficial solutions and ways to implement the partnership programme.

Our proposals are in line with the views expressed in many European countries. I hope that the Cracow Conference will also make a constructive contribution to these discussions.

Translated by Mirosław Łukawski. Verified with the Russian original by Marek Menkiszak.

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